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1 Introduction
In order to achieve sustainable growth, recycling is promoted around the
world. Promotion of recycling, in part, reflects increasing concerns for
waste disposal for its environmental and health effects, and an urgent need
to reduce the cost of waste treatment of landfills. Higher recycling rates
successfully prolonged the life of landfills and reducing the cost of waste
treatment. However, the recycling systems are now facing new challenges
in the globalized economy.
As the prices of natural resources rise, the international trade in recy-
clable materials has increased rapidly. Recyclable materials are no longer
perceived as “wastes”, but rather as resources. Being close substitutes for
virgin materials, recyclable materials are traded to meet the growing
resource demands in developing countries.１）
The recyclable materials are mainly traded from the developed coun-
tries to the developing countries. In particular, trade in recyclable materi-
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１） The world trade volume of recyclable aluminum, lead zinc, copper and paper
combined increased from 2.5 million tons in 1970 to 21.5 million tons in 1997.
See Van Beukering (2001). The trade to output ratio for the recycled copper,
paper and aluminum nearly tripled in the same period.
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als is eminent in Asian countries experiencing rapid economic growth.
Newly industrializing Asian countries have become the major importers of
recyclable materials in the world. In contrast to the trade patterns of natu-
ral resources, recyclable materials are traded from the North to the South.
Japan’s exports of recyclable materials, for example, are primarily
destined for China in the recent decades. Exports of plastic wastes in 2009
increased by 36 times in weight tones compared to the year 1990, and
scrap iron and copper increased by 24 times and 30 times respectively.２）
A rapid expansion of trade in recyclable materials is starving domestic
recycling sectors of input materials and putting them at risk of closing
down.
Trade policies associated with recyclable materials have shifted its
emphasis on import restriction on “wastes” to suppressing the outflows of
recyclable materials. When recycling was perceived as part of waste man-
agement, the main concern related to trade in recyclable materials was on
pollution dumping. In the 1980’s, exports of recyclable materials from the
developed to developing countries contained hazardous wastes and created
serious concerns for the environmental damages in the developing coun-
tries. This resulted in the enactment of the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Dis-
posal (so called the Basel Convention) in 1992, which prohibits transboundary
movements of unrecoverable wastes and hazardous recyclable wastes.
As the importance of recyclable materials as resources is realized, it
is now the exporting countries that attempt to impose trade restrictions.
In response to the rising prices and exports of recyclable materials, Japan,
２） See Satake and Saito (2010) and Kojima (2005) for Japan’s current trade pat-
terns of recyclable materials.
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for example, amended the recycling law to discourage exports of used
plastic bottles to protect the domestic recycling system. The new recycling
law for containers and packaging encourages “smooth delivery of waste
plastic bottles for sound recycling”; Local municipalities are expected to
transfer used plastic bottles to the domestic recyclers and not to the
exporters.
Yet, little is known theoretically on the optimality and the effects of
such trade policies on recyclable materials. Copeland (1991) examined the
effects of import tariff on wastes that generate externalities, however, trad-
ing of wastes are no longer allowed under the Basel Convention. Yama-
shige (2011) examined the optimal export taxes on recyclable materials, as
opposed to wastes. It has been shown that it is optimal to subsidize
exports of recyclable materials which is produced by using consumption
wastes in a simple one factor model.
It is a puzzle, why exports of recyclable materials, which may be op-
timal theoretically to subsidize, is in fact restricted in Japan. In this paper,
we characterize recyclable materials as traded intermediate goods which
are produced by using production wastes, and examine the optimal export
tax rate on recyclable materials in a specific factor framework. Then, we
try to explain why restrictive export policies on recyclable materials are
adopted by looking at endogenous policy making processes. In particular,
we look at the Japanese policy making process and formalize how trade
policies on recyclable materials are endogenously determined through rent
seeking activities among the special interest groups.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, Japanese
policymaking process is portrayed with a special reference to the policy
formation on recycling. In section 3, a simple trade theoretic model is
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presented to characterize the special interests associated with recycling.
An optimal export tax on the recyclable material is then analyzed in sec-
tion 4. In section 5, the endogenous trade policy formation through rent
seeking is discussed in two types of policy making processes; the frag-
mented policy making process and the non-fragmented process. We will
show that fragmented special interest politics as is observed in Japan may
lead to more protective trade policies in the recycling sector.
2 Special Interest Politics and Recycling in Japan
In some society, such as in the U.S., it is the politicians who play central
role in policymaking, hence, special interest groups lobby legislature.
However, there are other societies in which it is not necessarily the case,
and Japan is one of them. In Japan, bureaucrats play the dominant role in
framing and implementing policies. They articulate and mediate conflict-
ing interests through informal consultation; bureaucrats, without facing
accountability, control access to the policy making process, and may even
discourage the formation of interest groups that might disrupt the process.
Hence, for special interest groups, gaining an access to administration is
crucial. Participating in consultative council provides such opportunity.
In the Japanese policy making process, consultative councils, called
Shingikai, play a crucial role. Hundreds of consultative councils, com-
posed of business people, bureaucrats, scholars, journalists, union mem-
bers, and others, deliberate on virtually every aspect of public policy.３）
Policies are in many cases, discussed and formulated by the councils, not
by the legislature. Although councils were originally intended to introduce
３） See Schwartz (1998) for an insightful discussion on the role of councils in the
political process of Japan.
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new ideas and pluralize participation in the policy making process, partici-
pation is somewhat limited.
Japanese interest group politics is characterizes a “bureaucratically led
form of neopluralism”.４）As Schwartz (1998, p. 41) puts it; “What exists in
Japan is not a single policymaking process pitting bureaucrats, politicians,
private interests, and other concerned parties against one another, but an
assortment of distinct, fairly self-contained policymaking processes that
bring predictable sets of these actors together.” Councils bring together
well-organized and narrowly focused state and social actors and dominate
relatively self-contained policy domains by privatizing conflicts and re-
sorting to informal decision-making. The Japanese policy making process,
carried out in a fragmented policy domain which coincides with ministe-
rial jurisdiction, is not fully pluralized in a sense that bureaucrats select
certain interests to be represented in the councils.
Facing an urgent need to prolong the life of landfills, Japan has been
actively promoting recycling by enacting a series of recycling laws. Under
the recycling laws in Japan, containers and packaging, home appliances,
food, construction material, and end-of-life vehicles are subject to obliga-
tory recycling. Based on the Extended Producers Responsibility principle,
producers are made responsible for their product’s end-of-life environ-
mental impacts, and are obligated to pay recycling fees.５）The recycling
laws were discussed in councils and subcommittees such as the Waste
Prevention and Recycling Subcommittee, within the Industrial Structure
４） Neopluralists argue that as the government’s roles expand, policy making proc-
ess became more fragmented and specialized. The policy-making decisions are
made by relatively autonomous groups of policy experts sharing a specific pol-
icy focus.
５） Note that they do not pay for the collection costs, which are instead covered by
the municipalities.
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Council, which is organized by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) and the Central Environment Council, organized by the
Ministry of Environment. Their reports subsequently materialized to such
laws as the Basic Law for Promoting the Creation of a Recycling-oriented
Society, and the Law for Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of
Containers and Packaging.
The recycling system thus established did not assume the existence of
the international movement of recyclable materials and presumed the recy-
cling process to be completed domestically. In reaction to the rapid
increase in exports of recyclable materials, the new councils concerned
with the international aspect of the recycling system were organized. In
the working group for the recycling of containers and packaging, com-
posed of scholars (but no trade theorist), researchers, representatives of the
business groups (producers and retailers using the packaging) and consumer
groups, formed a consensus among the members that exports of used
plastic bottles need to be discouraged to secure stable supplies of waste
materials to the domestic recyclers.
In discussing the international aspect of the recycling system, the
METI council argues that there are concerns for an open system of recy-
cling because it might induce trade in improperly processed recyclable
materials, which results in exporting pollution, and also because of the
unstable market demand for recyclable materials abroad. Although the
council realizes the importance of enhancing effective utilization of re-
sources, it places a priority over an environmental concern. In response to
increased exports of used plastic bottles, the council subsequently
concluded that the amendment of the recycling law for containers and
packaging was necessary. The amendment addresses the “smooth delivery
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of waste plastic bottles for sound recycling” which encourages local
municipalities to deliver used plastic bottles to the designated (domestic)
recyclers and not to the non-designated recyclers who export them.６）
In order to examine the effects of the restrictive export policies on re-
cyclable materials adopted by the council, the basic trade theoretic model
is presented in the following section.
3 A Model
We consider a small open economy consists of three sectors producing
two final goods Xi (i  1 2) and a recyclable material, R. Final goods and
the recyclable material are both traded internationally. The price of the re-
cyclable material, PR , and the prices of final goods Pi ’s are both given
exogenously. In this section, we first lay out the basic structure of the
model in the absence of trade taxes, hence PR and Pi are considered as
international prices. Each final good sector uses a mobile factor, labor,
and a specific factor as inputs. The specific factor used in sector 1 is capi-
tal denoted by K , and the specific factor used in sector 2 is a natural
resource denoted by N .
Materials are recycled in sector 2 alone. Wastes generated in the
process of producing good 2 is recycled, and the recyclable materials (sec-
ondary materials), R, are used as inputs in the production of good 2.７）The
production functions for the final goods are;
X1  F1 (L1 K ) (1)
６） For details of the recycling system of used plastic bottles, see Satake et. al
(2010).
７） For example, used plastic bottles are used as inputs to produce recyclable mate-
rials such as plastic flakes or pellets.
Japanese Special Interest Politics and Trade Policies on Recyclable Materials
― ―２０５
X2  F2 (L2 R2 N ) (2)
where Li denotes the labor input in sector i, and R2 the recyclable mate-
rials used as inputs in the production of good 2. Fi is assumed to exhibit
constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to each factor including
the recyclable material.
In the process of producing X2 , wastes, ZR , are generated in a fixed
proportion to the output level;
ZR  X2  (3)
where  01 may be considered as the recycling rate.８） Non-
recycled wastes are assumed to be disposed of at no cost (including the en-
vironmental costs). ZR is then processed by using labor to become recycled
materials according to the Leontief technology of the form;






where LR denotes labor employed in the recycling sector, and ajR is the
input requirement of factor j for the production the recyclable materials.
The recyclable materials are either to be used as inputs in the production
of the final good 2 or to be exported.
We first analyze the effect of a change in the output prices on the
distribution of income and the composition of outputs. In a competitive
market, we can write down the unit-cost equations as
aL 1aK 1rK  P1 (5)
８） Endogenously determining is beyond the scope of the paper. The consumer’s
problem of choosing between garbage disposals and recycling is discussed, say,
in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995).
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aL 2  aN 2rN  aR 2PR P2 (6)
aLR   aZR rZ PR (7)
where aji is the input requirement of factor j for the production of
commodity i.
Cost minimization implies the following;L 1aˆ L 1 K 1aˆ K 10 (8)L 2aˆ L 2 N 2aˆ N 2 R 2aˆ R 20 (9)
The hat notation indicates the rate of change in that variable such thatˆdand ji is the factor payment share of j in commodity i. Tech-
niques of production in each sector depend on factor prices; aj 1
aj 1( rK )aj 2aj 2( rNPR ). We define 1 aˆ K 1aˆ L 1 ˆrˆ K to be the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital, with aˆ L 1K 11 ( ˆrˆ K )
aˆ K 1L 11 ( ˆrˆ K ).
With three factors of production being used in the production of good
2, we need to define three elasticities of factor substitution. Following the
notations used by Jones and Easton (1983), we define Ej 2aˆ ji ˆ to reflect
the effect on aj 2 of a rise only in the factor price of j with other two fac-
tor prices being held constant.
aˆ j 2Ej 2L  ˆ Ej 2N rˆ N  Ej 2R Pˆ R , j LNR (10)
Ej 2
 captures the substitutability or complementarity between factors j and, with own substitution effect Ej 2j negative. Zero homogeneity of aji
functions and the general envelope property imply that
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Ej 2
L  Ej 2N  Ej 2R 0 (11) L 2EL 2j   N 2EN 2j   R 2ER 2j 0 (12)
Upon totally differentiating the unit-cost equations,９）we obtain L 1ˆ  k 1rˆ K Pˆ 1 (13) L 2ˆ  N 2rˆ N   R 2Pˆ R Pˆ 2 (14) LRˆ  ZR rˆ Z Pˆ R (15)
In a specific factor model, factor prices cannot be determined by out-
put prices alone, so we now turn to resource constraints for labor, specific
factors, and the recyclable material:
aL 1X1  aL 2X2  aLR R L (16)
ak 1X1 K (17)
aN 2X2 N (18)
aR 2X2  RE R (19)
aZR R X 2 (20)
where L― is the amount of labor supply and RE is the export of the recy-
clable material. By substituting (17), (18) and (19) into (16) and totally
differentiating, we obtain






 L 1(aˆ L 1 aˆ K 1) L 2(aˆ L 2 aˆ N 2) LR (aˆ N 2)L  ( L 1K  L 2N ) (21)
Assuming K N 0，and by substituting the expressions for ajis;Lˆ1 rˆ K 2 rˆ N L R Pˆ R (22)L   L 11  L 2(EL 2L  EN 2L )  LR EN 2LK  L 11N  L 11  L 2(EL 2N  EN 2N )  LR EN 2NR   L 2 (EL 2R  EN 2R ) LR EN 2R
where j indicates the economy-wide substitution effect on labor as the
factor price of j increases. It consists of labor substitution in sector 1 and
sector 2 (represented by the direct substitution effect Ej 2j ) and the cross substitu-
tion effects (Ej 2j ). Since the direct substitution effect is negative, i.e.,
Ej 2
j 0, the signs of j s are: L 0, K 0, N 0.
To further proceed, we impose an assumption that N and the recycled
material are strong substitutes such that the following condition holds.
Definition 1 N and R are strong substitutes iff EL 2R EN 2R .
If N and R are close substitutes, R 0.
The equilibrium conditions are summarized by (13), (14), (22), and
(15). The system of equations (13), (14), and (22) allow us solve for fac-
tor prices, , rK and rN , and (15) determines rz . Output compositions are,




Japanese Special Interest Politics and Trade Policies on Recyclable Materials
― ―２０９
In a matrix form, the equilibrium conditions are given by        (23)
Solutions of the system give us the following.
(24)
where D is the determinant of 3 by 3 matrix; D   K 1 N 2L  L 1 N 2K  K 1 L 2N 0.
It is useful to write down the effects of the change in output prices
on factor prices, which characterize the underlying conflicts of interests























 L 1N 0 (29)
    1D     











( L 1K  K 1L )0 (30)
The wage rate positively responds to the changes in both output prices; As
Pi increases, labor is attracted from other sectors and the economy-wide
value of marginal productivity is increased. The return to the specific
factor in the i th industry must increase if Pi increases with other prices
remain unchanged. An increase in other output price, Ps (s  i ) raises the
return on the mobile factor, , hence reduces the return on the i th indus-
try’s specific factor. From (20), we obtain rˆ Z   LR ZR ˆ 1 ZR Pˆ R hence, we
can infer the directions of the change in the international price of the




0. If output prices rise,  is
increased while PR is held constant, which necessarily erodes the reward
on Z .















( R 2( L 1K  K 1L ) L 2 K 1R ) (33)
An increase in the price of recyclable material, while output prices being
held constant, reduces and raises rK . The reward earned from wastes rZ
is positively related to PR because of the decline in . The rise in PR
reduces rN if  R 2L  L 2R 0. The condition is likely to hold if i) the
own substitution effect is larger that the cross substitution effect, i.e.,
(EL 2L EN 2L )(EL 2R EN 2R ), and ii) sector 2 is more R intensive in the
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sense that  R 2 L 2. A decrease in PR , under certain conditions, will in-
crease and rN while decreas rK and rZ .
4 An Optimal Export Tax on Recyclable Materials
In this section, we analyze the welfare effects of export taxes on the
recyclable materials. In order to distinguish the domestic price and the
international price, we introduce the notation * to indicate the interna-
tional price. Let PR  be the international price of recyclable material and
PR be the domestic price of the recyclable material. Suppose an export
tax on the recyclable materials is imposed at a rate t such that
PR
 (1t )PR , and the final goods are traded freely; Pi Pi . If
dPi dPR 0, and d 0, then (1t )dPR PR dt dPR 0, or by
using the hat notations, tˆ Pˆ R , where tˆ  dt1t .
As a benchmark, we first consider a case where government acts be-
nevolently. Let g (P1P2u ; PR ) be the minimum expenditure required to
attain the welfare level u at domestic prices Pi and PR . When export
taxes are imposed, we can write the national income-expenditure identity
as follows:
g (P1P2u ; PR )P1 X1 P2 X2 (1t )PR RE tPR REP1 F1 (L1K )P2 F2 (L2NR2 )(1t )PR [FR (LRZR )RE ]tPR RE (34)
The minimum expenditure function is assumed to be equipped with the
following properties: i) positively homogeneous of degree one in Pi , ii)
concave in Pi , and iii) gPi Ci .







  i PidXidt (1t )PR dREdt tPR dREdt (35) (1t )PR FRZ ZRt t REt  PZ ZRt tPR REt (36)
The optimal export tax on the recyclable material, t, can be derived
by setting g0 dudt  0. The optimal tax rate can now be expressed as;
t PZ ZRt
PR
REt  Pz ZRPR RE Zˆ RtˆRˆ Etˆ  Pz ZRPR RE Xˆ 2tˆRˆ Etˆ (37)
Since an export tax on the recyclable material, under certain conditions,
increases X2 , the optimal export tax on recyclable material is positive if it
also increases an export of the recyclable materials, and negative if other-
wise.１０）
5 Rent-Seeking and An Export Tax on Recyclable Materials
In this section, an export tax on recyclable materials is to be determined,
not by the benevolent government, but by the councils. In the council, the
consensus is formed through voting or other method of reaching an agree-
ment. Although we do not explicitly formalize the consensus building
process within the council, participants of the council representing special
interest groups absorb scarce resources to influence the council’s decisions
to promote or to protect their interests. The special interest politics in the
Japanese policy making process is thus characterized as rent seeking
activities of the special interest groups in the councils.
Rent seeking activities take place in councils that are organized in
a fragmented policy domain. Special interests to be represented in the
１０） See Appendix for the analysis on the changes in X2 and RE .
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councils on recycling policies are confined to a rather narrowly defined
recycling related sector. Recyclers and recyclable material using sectors
were selected as members of the council, but, intentionally or not, sectors
not using recyclable materials were excluded.
In the following subsection, we characterize the export tax on
recyclable materials endogenously determined through the rent seeking
activities within the councils confined to a fragmented policy domain.
We call the equilibrium, the fragmented equilibrium. We then turn to the
non-fragmented equilibrium, in which the council is organized in the more
broader policy domain. Special interests representing all the sectors in the
economy are incorporated in the council. We will compare the two
equilibria.
5.1 Fragmented Equilibrium
Suppose the council consists of special interest groups representing the
recycling sector and the output sector 2 using the recyclable materials as
inputs. An export tax on recyclable material is to be determined endoge-
nously via tariff formation function formalized by Findlay and Wellisz
(1982);
t  t (LN LZ ) (38)
where LN and LZ are resources devoted to the rent-seeking activities by
the final good sector 2 and the recycling sector respectively. (16) is now
modified as
aL 1X1 aL 2X2 aLR R LN LZ  L (39)




tor is in favor of imposing an export tax on the recyclable materials, while
the recycling sector represented by factor Z is against it. By assuming the
“diminishing returns” to rent seeking activities; t LN 0,  2t LN2 0 (40) t LZ 0,  2t LZ2 0 (41)
The export tax is then determined through a Cournot game between the
two special interest groups with payoff functions N and ZN (LNLZ ) rN (t )N rN(PR)N L N (42)Z (LZLN ) rZ (t )ZR (t )rZ(PR)ZL Z (43)
where rj () is the reward on the specific factor j, j  NZ in the pres-
ence of an export tax, and rj() is the factor reward under free trade.１１）N
and Z are considered as rents from an export tax earned by the special
interest groups. Each interest group, taking other groups rent seeking
activity as given, will expend labor up to a point where the wage is equal
to the marginal return from rent seeking: Z rZ  rZ t  t LZ   N rN  rN t  t LN   (44)
The Nash equilibrium, assuming to exist, determines t˜, L˜ N and L˜ Z
１１） We assume that the tax revenue is distributed to consumers in a lump-sum
fashion so that it does not affect the rents sought by the special interest groups.
In the Japanese recycling system, the revenue from export tax is collected by
the national government, while the garbage collection and waste treatment costs
are born by the local government and producers. Public expenditures on waste
management and landfills may be financed through the tax revenue, in which
case the rent seeking activity is affected by such public expenditure.
― ―
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through (38) and (44).
5.2 Non-Fragmented Equilibrium
Suppose instead that the special interest group associated with capital, the
specific factor in sector 1, also joins the council to protect their interests.
Tariff formation function, then, becomes
t  t (LK LN LZ ), tLK 0, 2tLK2 0 (45)
with capital’s payoff functionK (LK LN LZ ) rK (t )K rK(PR)K L K (46)
which gives us the reaction function for capital to be KrK rKt tLK  . It is
worth spending LK in rent seeking activities to protect the capital owner’s
rent.
Among the three special interest groups, the capital and the waste
owners lose from an export tax on recyclable materials, while natural
resource owners gain from it. With the participation of the capital owners
in the rent seeking activities, the reaction function of N will be affected in
such a way that for each LZ , the smaller LN is chosen, as an increase in
LK is interpreted as an increase in LZ . The reaction function of Z , on the
other hand, will be altered such that larger LZ will be chosen for each LN ,
as an increase in LK be interpreted as reduction on LN . Hence, it is likely
that the export tax on the recyclable material determined by the three in-
terest groups’ rent seeking activities be lower than that determined by the
two interest groups. Characterizing Nash equilibria with three asymmetric
players would portray more general results, however, further conditions






In this paper, we analyzed the effects of export taxes on recyclable materi-
als in a specific factor model with recyclable materials, which are formal-
ized as traded intermediate goods produced by using production wastes.
Because recyclable materials are both used as inputs domestically or being
exported, the optimal export tax on recyclable materials was shown to be
either positive or negative depending on whether exports of recyclable
materials expands. We also examined the effect of an export tax on the re-
cyclable material on income distribution; it reduces the income of capital
owners and waste owners, while increases the wage and the reward on the
natural resource, which is a close substitute to the recyclable material.
Based on the distributive effects of the export tax on recyclable
materials, we illustrated how the export tax on recyclable material are en-
dogenously determined through rent seeking activities in the councils with
particular reference to the Japanese special interest politics. Negotiations
within the councils were incorporated by using the tariff formation func-
tion, and showed the possibility that it is the fragmented special interests
represented in the council that leads to the adoption of restrictive trade
policy on recyclable materials. Although the council claims the impor-
tance of environmental considerations, the rent seeking behavior in a
fragmented policy making process can be attributed to explaining the
adoption of an export tax on recyclable materials.
In this paper, the Japanese special interest politics was incorporated to
show how the rent seeking behavior in the Japanese bureaucratically
organized councils form the outcome of the trade policy on recyclable
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materials. With a very simple characterization of tariff formation allowed
us to highlight the role of councils in coordinating special interests. The
complexity of the Japanese special interest politics, however, is not ade-
quately captured yet. It has been often the case that foreign influences
(called “foreign pressure” in Japanese) played non-negligible roles in the pol-
icy making process. Considering foreign factor ownership, for example, in
rent seeking behavior may be worthwhile to examine.
The tariff formation approach, lacking the formal analysis of the indi-
vidual’s political behavior, does not provide any insights on how the con-
sensus is formed within the councils. Conflicts of interests are often
manipulated or contrived to reach the agreement, and bureaucrats are
involved in the process. Formalization of bureaucrats’ behavior, needless
to say the more sophisticated depiction of the interaction between the spe-
cial interest groups and the legislature, need to be addressed as well.
7 Appendix: Output Changes
In order to examine the changes in the output level of good 2 and the
amount of export of the recyclable material, we need to examine closely
the effects of factor substitutions between the three factors of production.
The effect of an export tax on recyclable materials (or equivalently, a reduc-





 (EN 2L  ˆtˆ EN 2N rˆ Ntˆ EN 2R ) (47)
An export tax on good 2 increases its output, Xˆ 2
tˆ
0, if the elasticity of
substitution between the recyclable material and the natural resource EN 2R
is sufficiently elastic, or if the own substitution effect of the natural re-
source dominates the cross substitution effects.
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The effect on RE is less clear-cut. By totally differentiating (19) and
by using (20) and (47), 2 (aˆ R 2 aˆ N 2) E Rˆ E Xˆ 2 (48)
where  2 R2R is the share of recyclable materials domestically used in
the production of good 2, and  E RER is the export share of recyclable
materials. We can observe that
Rˆ E
tˆ
 E Xˆ 2tˆ   2 E (aˆ R 2 aˆ N 2)tˆ (49)
The first term on the right hand side of the equation represents the supply
effect of the recyclable materials and the second term the factor demand
effect. If the demand effect exceeds the supply effect, the export decreases
as a result of an export tax, however, the export increases if the supply
effect exceeds the demand effect. Note that with higher , the supply
effect dominates, and the export expands, while with higher  2 , the de-
mand effect dominates, which reduces exports.
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